

THE PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION INITIATIVE (PeSCo) AS A STEP TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE UNION

Boštjan Peternelj

Independent consultant on defence matters

peternelj.bostjan@gmail.com

Petar Kurečić

University North, Department of Journalism, Koprivnica, Trg Žarka Dolinara 1, Croatia

petar.kurecic@unin.hr

Goran Kozina

University North, Department of Business Economics, Varaždin, Trg 104. brigade 3, Croatia

goran.kozina@unin.hr

ABSTRACT

More than six and a half decades after the Pleven Plan, which aimed to create the European Defense Community (EDU), the EU member states still need to formulate and elaborate a bold vision for the EU's defense integration consistent with current concerns about the security environment and austerity. Political talk about the "EU army" is a double-edged sword. There is no unifying vision for a leap towards a greater EU role in security and defense. The political debate flared up among EU member states when the topic is the development of military programme under the EU security community. Security changes and challenges for the European security could force states to rethink about restructuring of national armies that might be transformed and interrelated into European army and put under the unified EU's command. Out of 28 EU member states, with one supposed to leave the EU rather soon (the United Kingdom), 23 member states have signed the Permanent Structured Cooperation Agreement (PeSCo), thereby fulfilling the respective provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. PeSCo might be the right step in that direction.

Keywords: The European Union (the EU), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo), the European Defense Union (EDU), NATO, Russian Federation.

1 INTRODUCTION

More than six and a half decades after the Pleven Plan, which aimed to create the European Defense Community, the EU member states still need to formulate and elaborate a bold vision for the EU's defense integration consistent with current concerns about security environment and austerity. This vision takes into account calls for a recalibration of the EU defense efforts and, consequently, the Union's resilience and reputation as an autonomous security provider in its neighbourhood and beyond (Solana, 2016: 6). The European Defense Union (EDU) is an old political idea in the western part of Europe, an unfinished project, dating since the era NATO alliance was founded. The debate on the EDU opens many questions how to accelerate the EU's defense integration in the 21st century. The European Council has powers to establish a common defense with the EDU on the basis of permanent structured cooperation and a relevant collective self-defense clause (Article 42 Treaty of the European Union, TEU) and operationalise other relevant articles (Article 41 start-up fund, Article 44 TEU entrusting of CSDP missions to a group of Member States, Article 222 TFEU the solidarity clause) (EPP Group, 2016). The political founding has already been laid down on the fundamental basis by the TEU and the Lisbon treaty, which enable a build-up of self-sustainable defense system in the EU. However, the key problem lays in the lack of political will, and particularly unanimity, to achieve the EU's foreign policy goals and equally address security concerns of all EU member states within the Article 42(7) TEU. This article in the TEU should become the EU's equivalent of NATO's Article 5, in the subject of collective defense. The EU could care about its defense and military matters under the EDU establishment and change the 3C policy (cooperation and coordination in co-optation) from NATO's global policy. This way, the EU would get more autonomy and interdependence. It would also raise interconnectivity among the EU member states to guide defense policy within accepted federal concept of multinational super state.

In this paper, we address the afore-mentioned topic by giving the answers on these questions: Who would command the European army? Why has NATO so far not been replaced by the EDU? Where is the European defense policy headed, when it comes to cooperation, cohesion and co-optation with NATO's global strategy?

By giving answers to these questions, we need to take into consideration the fact that modern armies need inner guidance, accepted by the *Transformation Roadmap*, which explains the main direction of transformation, through rebuilding national armies and adapting military capabilities, by taking the concept of pooling and sharing managed under a single set of

forces. This major military goal has to be integrated into the transformation process of European armies, in order to achieve sustained interoperability between national armies, by making them fully interdependent and interrelated under a single command authority.

The member states agreed to step up the European Union's work in this area and acknowledged that enhanced coordination, increased investment in defence and cooperation in developing defence capabilities are key requirements to achieve it.

This is the main aim of the *Permanent Structured Cooperation* on security and defence (PeSCo), as outlined in the Treaty of the EU, Articles 42 (6) and 46, as well as in the Protocol 10. PeSCo is both a permanent framework for closer cooperation and a structured process to gradually deepen defence cooperation within the Union framework¹. Each participating Member State provides a plan for the national contributions and efforts they have agreed to make. These national implementation plans are subject to regular assessment. This is different from the voluntary approach that is currently the rule within the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy². The Lisbon Treaty incorporated all these provisions almost verbatim [Articles 42.6 and 46], albeit putting operational requirements, fiscal targets – although still not quantified – and multinational industrial cooperation roughly in the same basket and only changing the timeline for compliance mentioned in the relevant Protocol [no. 10] to 2010, as the treaty was expected to enter into force in the autumn of 2009 (Fiott et al., 2017: 18).

Fiott et al. (2017: 7) call PeSCo “sleeping beauty of EU defence”, hence no one was in a hurry to implement the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in the matters of defence: “Only after a series of meetings of, and non-papers by, EU foreign and defence ministers in the autumn of 2016 – Germany was particularly proactive, in the wake of the release of its White Book on defence – did the idea of testing PeSCo win the day as one of the vehicles to meet the ambitions set in the EUGS, albeit within the wider framework of the various initiatives” (Fiott et al., 2017: 20). Nevertheless, PeSCo might be the next step towards the European Defense Union.

2 THE TRANSFORMATION PLANNED BY THE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP

The contemporary transformation of the US military has been going on since 2006. The military expert team had pushed forward from the old, Cold War army structure, with

¹ Further information on the normative aspects of PeSCo can be found here: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf>.

² https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en.

divisional organization into territorial forces to a full-spectrum force within apprehended military capabilities that were fully manned, equipped and trained as body parts of brigade components. Modern military forces were organized around large and mostly mechanized divisions that had up to 15 000 soldiers. Under the new grand military plan, these military formations had been shrunk down to a modular brigade size level with up to 4 000 professional soldiers. What is the reality of building up multipurpose and multinational ad hoc battle formations? Officially, the EU governments can deploy and sustain the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal of 60 000 soldiers combined. Nevertheless, 18 years later, this can still not be accomplished without the help of others. And the almost ten-year-old Battle groups rotation scheme should be scrapped, since they have never been used (keeping one on standby for 6 months can cost over €100 million) (Andersson et al., 2016: 33).

The transformation of an army is an ongoing process that must never be promptly stopped; hence it shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations belonging to the modern military thinking. Modern states need transformation strategies so they might be able to transform their culture through innovative leadership and adaptive defense institutions, and ongoing transformed processes include high risks at adjudication that is using by the Trends of Future Force (re)construction. Transformed capabilities for interdependent joint operations are undergoing force transformation process before they are used (The Army Transformation Roadmap, 2004:14).

The EU – NATO states have accepted instructions as Army Transformation Plan and A Campaign-Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities, in order to provide a strategic approach to transformation, along with a campaign plan for executing the desired changes by adopting, in a carefully phased manner over the coming decade and beyond, modular formations and field networked systems, respectively. The new plan has been initiated through the discussion about the imperatives of defense transformation. The Army's roles in ongoing operations reflected the blur in the traditional distinction between combat and stability operations. In addition, the Army transformation plan emphasized the important role of new-era joint operation concepts in determining how new ground forces and capabilities should be built and used with joint functional concepts (battle space awareness, force application, focused logistics, and network-centric operations), and joint integrating concepts (forcible entry operations, global strike, joint logistics, and joint urban operations). The effect of these joint concepts was to create an operational framework within transformation efforts as to emphasize the importance of pursuing joint interdependencies for expeditionary

operations in joint battle command, joint fires and effects, joint air and missile defense, joint force protection, and joint sustainment (Kugler, 2008:13-14).

The EU states have been stuck in the military dilemma about the build-up of the European army. Helsinki Goals 2010 Document was in the first decade of the 21st century. However, advanced military solutions have still not been found. The process of military reform ought to be formulated by common requirements, and developed by advanced military technology, already accepted in the Requirements Catalogue, the Force Catalogue, and the Progress Catalogue. These Catalogues have implemented some tasks by using modern technology and assets in the Headline Goal 2010 and the Horizon 2010, respectively.

3 THE EU MEMBER STATES' PRIORITIES FOR THE EDU

The EDU as an effective international and supreme national body could build up gradual integrative cooperation among the EU member states, excluding the discrimination of states that would be based on strategic convergence. Policy integration around better cooperation at national level includes strategic upgrade to redefine back up plan for the EU's level of ambitions in response to changing threats in the globalised world, reform of institutions, procedures, and financing of a common EU defense, namely through regional clusters association by pooling and sharing military capabilities, the creation of a Euro group of Defense Ministers and the permanent EU military headquarters in Brussels that could facilitate quick planning, command, and control; then industrial harmonization process would follow, in order to re-galvanize the European defense technological and industrial base by stimulating investments and innovative research programs (Faleg, 2015). The EU may gain a political break out from deadlock on strategic and institutional level among member states on defense matters and accelerate cooperation amid resources and capabilities in the military field. This cooperation might be bundled under the same association body at international stance through a blueprinted institution, named the *European Defense Union* (EDU). The main priority of that body in the EU defense & military would not be to effectively support NATO. On the contrary, it would be capable to work autonomously, without NATO's military support and would not be submitted to any political directives from the U.S.A. or NATO. This is a focal point for the EDU as political response to the security decisions made under NATO's guidance that are destructive for the EU's overall defense. In that case the EDU would be founded only for the EU's purposes.

The EDU would be able to upgrade the EU's defense policy and deepen defense integration in Europe without NATO. Europe needs to reform itself in the field of common defense and find solutions by founding the EDU, serving only for European purpose about common defense and military matters, while the EU would need to start functioning independently in defense matters. If the EU accomplishes defense autonomy, the new European foreign policy strategy could be redrawn by defined common interests those were cemented into blueprinted or updated New Grand strategy. Concurrently, the EU strategy that had been issued in 2003 is overdue and not fit to confront with the present security challenges in Europe and its surroundings. The first step in performing institutional changes under the EU auspices dictates improved decision-making process, with high ranking political consensus under and the consent of all EU member states. If all of the EU member states agree with the idea for forming the EDU, then the second step would follow, in which the European Council would constitute a ministerial forum for consultation and decision making, established by the Council of Defense Ministers, which is upgraded with the EP Subcommittee on Security and Defense matter. The third step would include the establishment of the permanent EU military headquarters in Brussels. In the next step, the Subcommittee for Security and Defense in the European Parliament would be upgraded to a fully-fledged Committee. The strengthening of defense cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments in defense matters would be pursued (see Faleg and Blockmans, 2015:3). This political vision could recalibrate the EU defense policy towards autonomy. Military planning in would become EU fully integrated. Interoperable armed forces would be equipped by the single European defense market under the EDA auspices, with taking into regard technical modernization. The supreme headquarters in Brussels would ensure quick and effective planning, command, and control to European army, without relying on NATO command assets.

Several EU member states are supporting the stance that they would be able to form a permanent defense union, the EDU, and integrate their defense personnel and equipment into a common European defense force (Andersson et al., 2016: 31). The EU member states that support strong presence of NATO in Europe have negative attitude to form the EDU while they met with duplication of defense priorities amid EU and NATO. If the EU member states would make decisions to (re)built the military hardware component under the EDU guidance and reach consensus on the European defense policy, then the European army project would continue under ongoing transformation process by developing European infantry component, European navy and European air force. The force contingencies approved by national states participation plan would be put under a single chain of command and supported by a common

armament programme under the auspices of the European Defense Agency (EDA). Tactical units at battalion size units might increase to upper size to brigade and higher level units incorporated into joint operative formation corps and submitted to higher unit headquarters OHQ. Multinational forces set up under a single banner would be able to operate autonomously, on strategic level across the full spectrum of dominance into theatre of operation at home and abroad as to protect domain territory and would be capable to conduct a full spectrum expeditionary warfare activities abroad Europe for the EU's geopolitical benefit, and fight against versatile threats to the EU security. The EU member states should take concrete steps towards more efficient and effective framework for defense cooperation under the EDU.

The EDU would need to be approved by political consensus from all EU member states. As it has been known, the EU has no constitution and the idea of a defense union had failed to realise itself, since it was rejected by France 60 years ago. The main problem is the US policy in Europe that opposes the build-up of a strong EU super state in the political, economic, defense and military arena, in order to prevent counterweight to the US military might. The US policy over the Atlantic supports a Europe that of nation-states, which plays the main role in counterweighting the European federalism. The best example is probably, which Poland represents the most trusted US ally in Central Europe and a significant buyer of the US-made weapons. Poland and the Baltic States represent a geopolitical wedge between Russia and Germany. The establishment of a sizable US military and economic presence in Poland would supposedly strengthen Poland's position vis-a-vis Brussels, is a product of the ignorance of history. The EU elites' Europeanism is not anti-Atlantics. In its essence, it is complementary. Any effort aimed against the EU must be accompanied by an effort to liberate Europe from the US hegemony (Krupa, 2016). The problem of a long lasted political disunity of the EU represents the main problem to constitute the EU politically. The US policy, involved into the EU integration process has created, among other factors, a stall mate situation. This is one of the main reasons why the EU has not achieved the CSDP goals, which would make it more complementary, and drive a coherent and cooperative policy towards a reunited Europe.

It is interesting that, a bit contrary to the views of the elites from some European NATO members, which always show reserves towards European defence and emphasize the role of NATO, the citizens of the European Union overwhelmingly (with a 75 percent approval)

support a common European security and defence policy (CSDP), and more than half (55 percent) even favour a European army, as reported by EUROBAROMETER in June 2017³.

The EDU would be based on legal arrangement among the participating member states, which is separate from the EU and NATO treaties, but compatible with both (Andersson et al. 2016, 32). The political damage to the European pillar of NATO alliance had been done by the US “bitter friendship”. Therefore, the EU should consider the possibility of finding an alternative solution to the subordination to NATO, and repair the mistakes carried out by NATO’s policy. Old fashioned NATO alliance could survive⁴, and it needs a traditional enemy as to turn over the political downturn.

While EU’s Global Strategy, presented to the European Council in 2016, recognized that NATO is European, it is the Europeans that have to provide their part as well. The EU and NATO must work together, and the European members of NATO have to do better together. Despite the fact that the U.S.A. is still the EU’s de facto ultimate security guarantor, the situation may not last forever. Therefore, Europe has no choice but to become an autonomous security actor, and to be able to respond to crises in its immediate and more distant neighbourhood⁵.

Tab. 1: Defense spending of studied post-socialist NATO member states 2013-2016 (percent of GDP, based on 2010 prices)⁶:

NATO member states (ordered by the level of their contribution in 2016)	2013	2014	2015	2016
Estonia	1.90	1.94	2.07	2.16
Poland	1.72	1.85	2.23	2.00
Lithuania	0.76	0.88	1.14	1.49
Romania	1.28	1.35	1.45	1.48
Latvia	0.93	0.94	1.04	1.45
Bulgaria	1.46	1.32	1.29	1.35
Croatia	1.47	1.41	1.37	1.23

³ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1516_en.htm.

⁴ When Federica Mogherini presented the new EU Global Strategy to the European Council back in June 2016, she offered the European strategic community a key sentence that triggered a debate on the finalité of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): “While NATO exists to defend its members – most of which are European – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organized to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary.” (Kellner, 2017).

⁵ More in: *ibid*.

⁶ http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_160704-pr2016-116.pdf.

Albania	1.41	1.34	1.16	1.21
Slovakia	0.99	0.99	1.14	1.16
Czech Republic	1.03	0.96	1.06	1.04
Hungary	0.95	0.87	0.94	1.01
Slovenia	1.06	0.98	0.94	0.94

Source: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_160704-pr2016-116.pdf.

On the other hand, even after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, even the countries that are on the forefront of the possible US actions and are NATO and EU members, were not ready to increase their to the recommended level of two percent of the GDP. Nevertheless, the Baltic States plus Poland have shown that they are willing to increase their defense spending significantly, compared to other post-communist NATO members and other NATO members in general, respectively. It is obvious that NATO's members from the Baltic feel most threatened by Russia's new assertiveness, with Poland and Estonia showing the willingness to hold their defense spending at respectable level, above European NATO members average level even before 2014 and the events in Ukraine. It is certainly unrealistic to expect that NATO-Russia relations will improve in the foreseeable future, hence the geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic interests of the two parties are so opposed and mutually exclusive. However, although formally speaking with a unanimous vote, there are several different interests of the groups of states in NATO when the Russia issue is highlighted, of which we here can emphasize the two main:

- 1) The interests of the U.S.A., and their efforts to stay strategically present and the most important factor in the European part of NATO, with the states of the Three Seas Initiative, and especially Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania as the main allies, with a traditional ally the United Kingdom as well (now de facto out of the CSDP of the EU).
- 2) The interests of the states of the EU Core, i.e. Germany and France, with Belgium and Luxembourg following their lead. The interests of these states are mostly expressed through the efforts to build CSDP of the EU, and maintain good economic relations with Russia, with certain efforts to lower the level of strategic rivalry and open a dialogue with Russia.

Other interests, of smaller or not so interested groups of state are not so important, at the same time showing that European part of NATO and the EU as well comprises a couple of different priorities and interests of various groups of states, which derive

from their geographical location, geopolitical position, historical experience, and their present situation:

- 1) The divide among the post-communist NATO members, on the more assertive group of the “New Cold Warriors”: The Baltic States, Poland, Romania, and from recently Croatia as well, on one side, and the group of more pragmatic, not so anti-Russia oriented, for economic cooperation interested Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria, with the Czech Republic “playing for both sides” (Kurečić, 2017).
- 2) The Southern members of NATO and/or EU have their own interests, with Italy showing interest in economic cooperation with Russia, and gas pipeline, Spain and Portugal having their own issues and problems, with geographical distance and the lack of negative historical experience with Russia/Soviet Union as the main factor of de facto “ignoring the issue” in their policies, although complying with the sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU as a whole. Greece and Cyprus traditionally have good political and economic relations with Russia, and Greece is interested for South Stream Project. Turkey under Erdogan, although it had a brief period of deterioration with Russia, after the shooting down of Russian military airplane over Syria-Turkey border, has very good economic and political relations with Russia, that concurrently deteriorate Turkey-EU relations.

During the campaign, the US President Donald Trump had been saying that NATO is obsolete, first because it was designed many, many years ago, and the NATO member states were not paying what they should and NATO was not dealing with terrorism (ZeroHedge, 2017). Nevertheless, until July 2017, Trump has more than once reaffirmed its support to NATO, and especially to Poland, the Baltic States, and most recently, to the Three Seas Initiative, the group of mostly post-socialist NATO and/or EU member states between Germany and the European core on the west, and Russia/Belarus/Ukraine on the east. Ending the dependence on Russian gas, firm support to NATO, support to Ukraine’s future membership represent some of the initiatives tied to the Three Seas Initiative, developing under Polish and ultimately, the US auspices.

How would the possible EDU function? The EDU meetings would be held by assembly sessions at defense ministerial level, appointed by the general secretariat of the EDU. Those meetings could replace Political Security Council on the defense matter, while it narrows

security sector priorities by focusing on defense decision making process in CSDP?⁷ In fact, many essential structures suitable for conducting European army are already in place, such the EU Military staff by conducting military activities at strategic and operational level C4I and the EDA by armouring and equipping single set of forces under common armament programs. Multinational military structures with command staffs also exist as the ad hoc EUBG formations, but the most prominent and existing land forces component is established by European corps (established by Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and Holland as hard-core of former WEU) since 1992 based in Strasbourg, before than the Franco – German parachute brigade was established in 1987, and after then the Multinational Corps Northeast based in Szczecin was established in 1998 (by Denmark, Germany and Poland). Small sized EU battle groups on battalion strength level that consist of high ranking formation at national level, and are submitted to operative corps core as essential units to those two operative formations (see Andersson et al., 2016: 34).

4 COMMANDING IN THE EUROPEAN FORCES

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) located in Mons, Belgium, is the strategic level headquarters of Allied Command Operations (ACO) and commanded by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR assumes the overall command of operations at the strategic level and exercises his responsibilities from SHAPE. He issues strategic military direction to the subordinate commanders. SACEUR is responsible for the preparation and conduct of all Alliance military operations, including routine operational activities and other non-operational tasks (NATO, 2016). Its priority is also to strengthen command and control above submitted European cell that is responsive to command on operative level to military branches under EU banner. While ACO manages with key military infrastructure in Europe, the net centric C4I system is fused together and being cabled at central point from ACO to national supreme commands from each member state of the EU– and NATO. Commitment to SHAPE by C4I cable includes only national troops those were put under supreme NATO and EU command, while territorial defense units as permanent reserves stayed under national HQ.

⁷ Perhaps the first steps can be recognized in the following proposals from the EU Global Strategy: The establishment of a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the EU Military Staff in Brussels, the launching of a European Defence Fund, and the decision on a road map to initiate the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo).

In the future, any political revolution would happen to change military attitude in the ACO by planning and executing joint operations in Europe without US army top officers interfering. The European army would be commanded and controlled by small headquarters as military cell under SACEUR supervision that counts approximately to 200 high ranking officers. Due to Europe's enhanced role in NATO, SACEUR alternates between a US and a European officer with Deputy SACEUR, appointed from the other side of the Atlantic (Andersson et al., 2016: 28). European cell has symbolic military role by C4I among European forces, while those European officers are placed in SHAPE and ACO departments, and submitted to the supreme commander SACEUR which is US army high ranking officer with general ranks. Here European high ranking officers played secondary role by taking strategic military decisions, because military superiority in NATO was given to superpower US states since North Atlantic agreement had been signed. Euro - Atlantic relationship had changed political vision in Europe after European states had distanced our self from rebuilding European security toward autonomy and independence. NATO in Europe presents a stumbling block to form European army while US side had gained total control among European army transformation process under Pentagon cabled centric bodies SHAPE and ACO. What we have need to do at this point as to get (re)starting again with military integration process to build-up command structure on strategic and operative level autonomy without net centric NATO command and control system under US supervision.

5 DIVIDED POLICIES ON THE ISSUE OF FORMING OF THE EUROPEAN ARMY

Political talk of an "EU army" is a double-edged sword. There is no unifying vision for a leap towards a greater EU role in security and defense. If pushed too far, the discourse of an EU army will backfire and could lead to deeper divisions between larger and smaller member states, between richer and poorer countries or between governments. Political repercussions amid common army structure put under supreme command had begun since adopted the Lisbon Treaty, but political open talks into deeply defense and military integration process had divided EU member states into political hubs. Build-up vision for European army can be tailored by the EU member states into four political hubs. The first political hub, established by France, Belgium, and Holland had singled out that European defense could be accepted with the Lisbon treaty by conducting CSDP. The second political hub established among former socialist states by Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic States with Italy had reclaimed that NATO alliance is a corner stone for guarantee in Europe against

Russian aggressive stands, disagree and oppose to duplicate military forces in Europe, and the gate by cooperation among states are still open toward build-up complementary forces between NATO forces and EUBG into mutual interests. The third hub around Germany had atoned build-up European army toward federalization of EU relations for more integration and more Europe. Basic current of ongoing military integration process in EU could be supervised by scrutiny overview under the European parliament legislation that would have legislative right by federal constitution to approve sending troops without authorisation basis from national parliaments if they do not consent and take decisions. In opposite statement to this idea by German proposal as to get authorised the European parliament to vote among defense and military legislative by federal law of defense matters, the United Kingdom was strongly opposed to forcefully military integration process by EU member states while this political idea could endanger or weaken NATO cohesion in Europe. For British political hawks it is absolutely clear that defense responsibility must stay under national authorities. Could major NATO centric states the United Kingdom in Europe on referendum Brexit strong opposing to European integration process a vote against federalization of EU, and endanger an existence of EU in future? However, Brexit kept doorway wide open to mitigate European cohesion and returning back to national states by torpedoing European unity under disintegration process absolutely as politically diversion. Same opinion like the United Kingdom was asserted by second NATO centric state Poland, which does not want European army. By the Polish political opinion to strengthening military integration process is bad idea while it could shake NATO cohesion, and meant as directly attack against US presence in Europe through NATO alliance. Many EU member states were not interested or stayed beside undecided among deepening and widening European army. Some marginal EU member states are avoiding to sensitive topic while they are suffering from interstate problems. They excuse and distance our self from European security matters to national top priorities while foreign policy put on second track and get dedicate to internal problems such economic recession, fiscal crises, social problems of society etc. (see Cigler, 2015). The US side being critical while strongly oppose to political idea to build-up European army.

Some EU member states had expressed political opinion by forming or declining idea among EU army or with mixed taste about common military project. The UK government had immediately rejected the prospects of an EU army with main reason that defense is a national responsibility. In opposite opinion, German government seemed to welcome the idea by supporting the perspective of a European army. French government had said that the European army was an illusion, despite the country's long-standing vision of a stronger

Europe in defense. Austrian government supported the idea of EU army that could benefit from supporting greater “communalisation” of the EU's foreign and security policy, leading ultimately to a common European defense. Poland government commented that the EU army proposal was a “very risky idea”, stressing that the focus of Europeans should be on strengthening NATO, which remains ultimately the “guarantor of a secure Europe”, and the EU army is an “impractical dream”, as such an army would need first of all a politically integrated Europe as decision-maker. Among the Baltic States, Latvia governments also voiced scepticism over the idea, warning against any duplication with NATO, while on the other hand, found the idea of an EU army “interesting, but very fresh”. The Finnish government considered the idea unrealistic for the time being, although welcomed the debate on the issue, as Finland supported a common EU security policy. Conversely, and expressed support for the creation of a joint EU army that could provide added value if followed by other EU member states (EPRS, 2015). Otherwise, it seems that EU work unconnected and politically divided into Diaspora, who belong to either Europeanist or Atlantic political hub. Without political consensus, it is impossible to follow united defense policy goals under the EDU that is main condition to form European army too. If some EU states get following ardent this defense policy issue that NATO will remain the collective defense bedrock for most of the EU member states for the foreseeable future, then we cannot expect turnover at night to form the EDU without political consensus from Euro sceptic states as being political puppet to US security policy. But the transatlantic Alliance cannot be everywhere, and Europeans increasingly have to cope with some security challenges by themselves, without help from the United States. Acting through the EU, therefore, is an important strategic option for EU member states (Keohane, in Andersson et al., 2016: 31). The difference between PESCO and other forms of cooperation is the binding nature of the commitments undertaken by participating member states. However, participation remains voluntary and decision-making will remain in the hands of participating member states⁸. PeSCo should benefit, as a part of the broader CSDP framework, from the support of various EU bodies, primarily the

⁸ PeSCo will have a two-layer structure:

Council Level: Responsible for the overall policy direction and assessment mechanism to determine if Member States are fulfilling their commitments.

Only PeSCo members are voting, decisions are taken by unanimity (except decisions regarding the suspension of membership and entry of new members which are taken by qualified majority).

Projects Level: PeSCo's effectiveness will be measured by the projects it will develop. Each project will be managed by those Member States that contribute to it.

See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en.

EDA and the European External Action Service (EEAS), under the overall supervision of the High Representative (Fiott et al., 2017: 32).

6 CONCLUSION

The EDU could boost or speed up defense integration process by accepting German and French proposals in the EU, to clear political path toward constituted EU federalization state. The French initiative supports tightening the European defense policy to form the EDU body, but a European army under single command could be build-up by German initiative. In opposite scenario political disintegration forecast by predicting EU future that falls apart on regional mini coalition states like the Nordic, Mediterranean, Alpean, and Central European regional concept of associations etc. NATO strongly opposes the establishment of the EDU. A weakened EU is needed to US to manage an entire control politically, economically and military ongoing EU development by political consolidation toward constituted super state. A stronger EU after Brexit and migration crises seems like an impossible mission to achieve, because the EU has fallen into political apathy. In reality, the EU defense policy is still ineffective to confront with global security problems.

What the EU member states could achieve by the EDU in army transformation process? First, powerful joint military forces could be building up with less money spending by national investments on long term for common purposes. Important common achievement by army transformation are sizing five joint attributes by attaining expeditionary interdependencies, those attributes are unified battle command, joint military assets, conventional force projection, military capabilities and sustainment into logistic and services. Second, the European army could be equipped with most advanced military capabilities that being capable to conduct full spectrum operations abroad Europe. Double track C4I system functions inseparably of the internal EU – NATO command structure, but the problem is systematically how to separate European army HQ from SHAPE to work autonomously. If the political consensus among the EU member states on defense integration process, which would result in forming of the EDU would not exist, then this multilateral cooperation would be symbolic, functioning through partial armament cooperation programs among the EU member states in the PeSCo initiative. Although military capacities developed within PeSCo would remain in the national hands that can make them available for NATO, OSCE or other mechanisms, Therefore, PeSCo might be the next necessary step for the development of the EDU.

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