engleski

Self in Ancient philosophy

In the field of ancient philosophy there is an ongoing debate about the way ancients understands the question of the individual as a self and more importantly whether they operate with anything similar to the modern concept of selfhood in "subjective- individualist" terms. My aim is to explore opposed views offered by C. Gill on the one side and R. Sorabji on the other and to argue in favor of latter reading. Gill argues for a holistic interpretation of a person in Greek philosophy where a human being is understood as a structure of three different aspects: metaphysical, psychological and ethical. The result of such a view is the idea of a person as an “objective participant” which is highly incompatible with usual terminology of personhood such as I-centeredness, me-ness or individuality. On the other side, Sorabji argues against Gill’s idea of structured self and claims that human beings could not survive unless they thought of themselves in terms of the me and me again. Therefore, in Sorabji’s view ancient philosophers undoubtedly show an interest in the individual person and in the individual seeing itself in terms of me. I will analyze Plato’s, Aristotle’s and Epicurean concept of the self and argue that Sorabji’s conception of selfhood in terms of varieties conceptions of self in ancient philosophy is more plausible and fits better within ancient teleological-eduaimonistic ethical framework.

self, ancient philosophy, structured self, personhood, I-centeredness

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